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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

ROBERT PAUL PACHECO,

:

Case No. 880281-CA

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Issues,
Statement of the Case, and Statement of the Facts are set forth in
Appellant's opening brief at v-vi, 1-6.

Appellant takes this

opportunity to reply to Respondent's brief.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS (CLARIFICATION)
Mr. Pacheco briefly replies to the State's statement of
the facts in an attempt to clarify and otherwise correct potentially
misleading characterizations of the facts.
In the State's preparation of the Statement of the Facts,
the State repeatedly claims Mrs. Luna's identification of
Mr. Pacheco was unequivocal and that she was able to positively
identify him.

Brief of Respondent at 5-7.

The State further

contends that the detective involved in the case did not suggest to
Mrs. Luna that she identify anyone in either photospread shown to
her.

Brief of Respondent at 6.

For clarification, the positive

nature of Mrs. Luna's identification of Mr. Pacheco was obtained

only after a process fraught with impermissible police assistance
suggestively guiding the identification.

Within one week after the

incident. Police Detective Lamont showed Mrs. Luna a photospread of
driver's license photographs and Mrs. Luna was unable to positively
identify the perpetrator (T. 61-62); she did, however, indicate that
the photograph of Mr. Pacheco could be the person but that she was
not sure (T. 62-63, 79). Detective Lamont affirmed that tentative
identification by indicating to Mrs. Luna that she had in fact
pointed out the right person (T. 64). Detective Lamont further
informed her that the photograph was an older one and that he would
return with a more recent photograph of Mr. Pacheco (T. 64).
Within several weeks, perhaps a month later, Detective
Lamont returned with a second photospread.

This photospread was

enclosed in a manilla folder labeled " f MUG f SHOW-UP FOLDER"
containing six mug shot photographs—both frontal view and profile
view—paperclipped

in a manner to expose the frontal view photograph

through six cut-out windows of the folder (Exhibit Six) (T. 65).
Notably, Robert Paul Pacheco was the only individual repeated in
both photospreads (T. 63-65, 72, 86). Further, before showing
Mrs. Luna this second photospread, Detective Lamont informed her
that the suspect was included in the photospread (T. 72). Mrs. Luna
indicated that the only familiar picture she observed in that second
photospread was the photograph of Mr. Pacheco (T. 72).
Therefore, the State's assertion that the detective did
not suggest to Mrs. Luna that she identify anyone in either
photospread, while ostensibly correct, is suggestively misleading.
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Further, it is similarly misleading to indicate in the Statement of
the Pacts that Mrs. Luna's identification of the Defendant was
unequivocal.
The State also indicates in their Statement of the Facts
that Mr. Pacheco was unable to articulate why he remembered April 7
as the day he had loaned his car to his son, Troy.
Respondent at 7.

This is not true.

Brief of

Mr. Pacheco was able to

articulate why he recalled April 7 as the day he had loaned the car
to his son because of a phone call from his cousin (T. 119-20/
128).

It was not the occasion of April 7 that created difficulty

for Mr. Pacheco to recall but a second and irrelevant occasion when
he had loaned the car to his son, Troy (T. 128).
Along this line, the State further contends that
Mr. Pacheco was somehow inconsistent in his testimony regarding
whether the children accompanied Troy when he returned the car.
Brief of Respondent at 7.

This testimony is not inconsistent as

alleged and, when read in context of the testimony, indicates
nothing more than when Troy returned, Mr. Pacheco originally had no
idea whether the children were with him; but later he asked Troy and
was told that Troy had taken the children back to Heber City
(T. 126-27).
Finally, while recognizing that there is a family
resemblance between Mr. Pacheco and his son, Troy, age twenty-two,
the State subverts the facts by indicating that Mrs. Luna identified
Mr. Pacheco and not Troy as being the perpetrator.
Respondent at 7-8.

Brief of

This characterization is unfair and unwarranted
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inasmuch as a photograph of Troy was not provided in the
photospreads supplied to Mrs. Luna.

SOMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Contrary to the State's assertions, the quality of the
photographs used in the two showups are not as telling as are the
procedures utilized by the detective in reaffirming the
identification of Mrs. Luna, the sole witness identifying
Mr. Pacheco as the burglar.

The processes utilized to obtain the

identification was suspect and questions whether the identification
was a product of memory or of the procedures employed such that the
identification testimony of Mrs. Luna violated Mr. Pacheco's due
process rights.
Mr. Pacheco's constitutional rights of due process and a
fair trial were violated when a mug shot photograph of Mr. Pacheco
was admitted and published to the jury over the objection of defense
counsel and where evidence of a prior conviction for Attempted
Burglary reached the jurors.
The circumstances surrounding this case indicate that
Mrs. Luna's memory is far from remarkable.

Based on the procedures

utilized to obtain her testimony and the surrounding evidence and
circumstances, insufficient evidence existed for reasonable jurors
to conclude that Mr. Pacheco was the perpetrator of the burglary and
theft involved in this case.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES UTILIZED TO
OBTAIN IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY AGAINST
MR. PACHECO VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS.
The dispositive issue on this point is whether
Mrs. Luna's identification of Robert Paul Pacheco as the perpetrator
of the burglary of the Welch home is independent on its own merits
or whether that identification was rendered unreliable and suspect
by the suggestive processes utilized by police.

The State suggests

that the first photospread shown to Mrs. Luna consisted of
photographs of such poor quality that she was unable to positively
identify Mr. Pacheco, but once shown a better quality photograph,
she was able to make that identification.
8-9.

Brief of Respondent at

Later, the State contends that the first photospread of black

and white photographs was not recent and the more recent photographs
in the second photospread enabled the witness to make the
identification.

Brief of Respondent at 13. The State also

exaggerates the nature of the identification, repeatedly referencing
the identification as "unequivocal" and "positive," ultimately
concluding the identification to be reliable under the totality of
the circumstances.

Brief of Respondent at 14-16.

The State's analysis is incomplete and contrary to the
facts.

At a minimum, Respondent's position is overstated.

The

facts of this case disclose a genuine concern that the procedures
employed by the detective were so suggestive that it is not possible
to determine whether the identification was a product of the
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procedures themselves or of Mrs. Luna's memory.
The critical facts overlooked by the State are: Within
days of the event, April 7, 1987, Detective Lamont approached
Mrs. Luna with the first photospread containing black and white
driver's license photographs (T. 77-78).

Mrs. Luna was unable to

positively identify anyone within the photospread as the perpetrator
of the crime {T. 62, 79). She did, however, indicate that the
photograph of Mr. Pacheco, a driver's license photograph taken in
August of 1983, could be the person but that she was just not sure
(T. 62-63, 79). At that juncture, it is critical to note that the
detective informed Mrs. Luna that she pointed out the suspect
(T. 64). He further indicated that he would find her a more recent
photograph of the suspect (T. 64).
Within weeks, Detective Lamont returned to Mrs. Luna with
a second photospread which contained six mug shot photographs
paperclipped in a folder marked in large black bold letters "'MUG1
SHOW-UP FOLDER" (T. 65) (Exhibit 6-S). Upon showing Mrs. Luna this
second photospread, Detective Lamont instructed her that the suspect
was included in the photospread (T. 72). Again, it is critical that
not only did the detective inform her of the suspect's presence in
the photospread, but Mr. Pacheco was the only person whose
photograph was repeated from the first photospread (T. 63-65, 72,
86).

In fact, Mrs. Luna herself commented that the only one she

recognized from the first photospread was Mr. Robert Paul Pacheco
(T. 72).
Additionally, the second photospread presents additional
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problems.

Mrs. Luna admitted at trial that the second photospread

did not contain pictures of others who reasonably resembled
Mr. Pacheco.

She agreed that most of those in the photographs were

of younger individuals and that it was obvious Mr. Pacheco was much
older (T. 66). The trial court also recognized the disparity in the
ages of those in the photographs (T. 94).
Even assuming that a problem existed with either the
quality or the black and white nature of the photographs, which
Mr. Pacheco urges the Court to reject as untenable, the fact that
Mrs. Luna recognized him as being repeated from the first
photospread and, more importantly, that he was the only person
repeated from the first photospread contaminates the later
identifications.

Further contamination occurred when the detective

instructed Mrs. Luna that he would bring a more recent photograph of
the suspect whom she had tenatively identified and when he informed
her that the suspect was included in the second photospread.
These facts, overlooked and unaddressed by the State in
its brief, indicate a legitimate concern that it is questionable
whether the identification of Mr. Pacheco was a product of
suggestive show-up procedures and the affirmations and
reaffirmations of the detective or whether it was a product of her
memory.

In short, the procedures utilized to obtain the

identification testimony of Mrs. Luna were so suggestive that they
give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification resulting
in a due process violation.
The State also at length applauds the memory of
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Mrs, Luna, particularly pointing out her ability to recall the
license plate a year later when the case went to trial.

Again, such

a contention does not establish her ability to remember Mr, Pacheco
as the individual who perpetrated the crimes in this case.

If

anything, when contrasting her recall of the license plate number
with her inability just days after the event to select the
perpetrator with any sense of surety, one should hazard to rely on
that memory as a basis for incarceration.

Also noteworthy is the

fact that the other witnesses of the event all indicated the culprit
to have been a much younger man (T. 21, 30, 42, 87), and one such
witness, Mrs, Eward, actually identified a different individual
other than Mr. Pacheco from the first photospread (T. 21).
The State also urges that Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188
(1972), indicates that suggestiveness alone is not sufficient to
suppress pretrial identification but rather the standard of
examination is to be made under a totality of the circumstances.

As

the State conducts the examination of the five factors articulated
in Biggers, this Court should note that the suggestive factors in
the identification process themselves are absent from the analysis
as well as the initial uncertain identification so soon after the
events in question.

When these considerations are factored in, the

totality of the circumstances indicate the identification to be
unworthy of reliance and violative of due process safeguards.
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has recently criticized
the five factors of Neil v. Biggers stating that "several of the
criteria listed by the Court are based on assumptions that are
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flatly contradicted by well-respected and essentially unchallenged
empirical studies."

State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 491 (Utah 1986).

Critical for this case, the Utah Supreme Court notably singles out
the "level of certainty" factor of Neil v. Biggers stating:
Research has also undermined the common notion
that the confidence with which an individual makes
an identification is a valid indicator of the
accuracy of the recollection. In fact, the
accuracy of an identification is, at times,
inversely related to the confidence with which it
is made.
721 P.2d at 490 (citations omitted).

In suggesting valid

considerations for determining the accuracy of eyewitness testimony,
the Utah Supreme Court replaced the "level of certainty" factor with
the consideration of "whether the witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was
the product of suggestion."

721 P.2d at 483. Once the suggestive

police behavior is factored into the analysis, the totality of the
circumstances balance against the State and in favor of the position
of Mr. Pacheco advanced herein.
Finally, the State encourages that although Mr. Pacheco's
photograph was the only photograph repeated in both photospreads,
that fact does not render the process unduly suggestive and is a
factor which alone is insufficient to justify such a finding.

Brief

of Respondent at 16. The State cites State v. Alvarez, 701 P.2d
1178 (Ariz. 1985), for this proposition.

However, State v. Alvarez

actually states that "the fact that a defendant's photograph was the
only one to appear twice was not necessarily fatal" (Id. at 1180;
emphasis added), indicating, at least implicitly, that the totality
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of the circumstances would then have to overcome the suggestive
nature of the identification processes utilized.

Mr. Pacheco

insists that an examination of the totality of the circumstances is
unable to overcome the taint of the identification processes
employed by the police in his case.

See Point III, infra, and Brief

of Appellant at 13-16.
Moreoverf Mr. Pacheco does not assert that the repetition
of his photograph among both photospreads is the only error that
occurred in the identification process.

Mr. Pachecof as indicated

above, also contends that the detective showing the photographs
reaffirmed the initial unsure identification; that he promised to
bring a more recent photograph of the suspect; and that he then
informed the witness that the suspect was among the photospread.
Each of these actions are additional factors alleged as violative of
Mr. Pacheco's due process rights, as is the additional factor of the
"'MUG1 SHOW-UP POLDER" itself (see Point II of Appellate's opening
Brief and this reply).
The primary evil to be avoided with suggestive showups is
the likelihood of misidentification.

In addressing this issue, the

United States Supreme Court stated in Simmons their concerns and
cautioned against several specific dangers which increase the
possibility of this misidentification.

Many of the dangers the

United States Supreme Court warned against have occurred in this
case.

See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).

The

United States Supreme Court explained when these abnormalities
occur, "the witness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the
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image of the photograph rather than of the person actually seen,
reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent or courtroom
identification."

_Ld. at 383-84.

Inasmuch as these and other recognized dangers occurred
in this case, a violation of due process has occurred and this Court
must therefore reverse the conviction of Mr. Pacheco and remand for
a new trial absent the testimony secured through the suggestive
identification process.
Supreme Court's mandate:

Such a ruling would conform to the Utah
"Under the standard in State v. Perry,

reversal is demanded where the identification is so unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that
the defendant is denied due process."

State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d

56, 59 (Utah 1982) (citation omitted).

POINT II. EVIDENCE INDICATING PRIOR CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR BY MR. PACHECO ERRONEOUSLY REACHED THE
JURY, PREJUDICING HIS RIGHT TO A FUNDAMENTALLY
PAIR TRIAL AS CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED.
A.

MUG SHOWUP POLDER

The State distorts the nature of the exhibit challenged
by Mr. Pacheco in this issue.

The State asserts that:

Though the placard in front of the photograph said
"Salt Lake County Sheriff," the phrase was not
sufficient to plant in the minds of the jurors the
idea that the pictures were taken in the course of
a previous arrest. Aside from the placard
designation, the pictures have none of the
characteristics which a juror would associate with
an arrest photograph. The pictures showed no
dates or numbers and contain only a full frontal
view of the men, not the typical front and side
view a person might associate with an arrest
photograph. A juror looking at the photospread
- 11 -

could assume that the pictures were taken by the
Sheriff's office purely for identification
purposes.
Brief of Respondent at 17. This observation is in error and
contrary to the exhibit.

The exhibit bears a title in bold black

letters nearly one-half inch tall which states, "'MUG1 SHOW-UP
FOLDER."

This alone is enough to suggest the nature of the

photograph, but, more importantly, the photographs show much more
than indicated by the State.

The placard in front bears the name

Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office and contains a number (including
the date) and an additional handwritten number.

The exhibit itself

contains six photographs of both frontal and profile views. While
it is true that only the frontal view appeared in the window, these
photographs were secured by six large paperclips and were easily
accessible to being moved or the folder opened and looked inside to
see the profile photographs.

The record reflects that at some point

this fear was a concern of both the Court and counsel, and some
contemplation was given to a "don't mess with it" instruction
(T. 60-61).

An instruction, however, was not given and the jury was

free to closely examine the folder either directly or inadvertently
as paperclips can slip and the photographs easily adjusted.
The State also misapprehends the status of Utah law on
the issue of the admissibility of mug shot photographs.

The State

contends that in State v. Owens, 388 P.2d 797 (Utah 1964), the Utah
Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a photospread containing
mug shots.

However, State v. Owens and a subsequent case, State v.

McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982), only peripherally address the
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question at issue here.

In State v. Owens and State v. McCardell,

the Utah Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether mug shot
photographs are too prejudicial and therefore inadmissible
evidence.

Procedural shortcomings prevented the Court from reaching

the merits of that question in both cases.

However, the Supreme

Court notably commented in State v. McCardell that the appellant's
claim of extreme prejudice "clearly [has] merit," though that issue
was deemed unreviewable because of counsel's failure to object at
trial.

652 P.2d at 946. Accordingly, the State is correct to

assert that the case of United States v. Harrington, 490 P.2d 47
(2nd Cir. 1973), and the three-prong test enunciated therein has not
been adopted by a Utah appellate court.

That assertion is true

because Utah courts have yet to address the issue.

Mr. Pacheco,

however, urges that the Harrington standard is the recommended
standard to protect both interests at stake in this concern.
Addressing the Harrington factors, the State suggests
that Mr. Pacheco brought into question the identification procedures
utilized by the police, thereby allowing the admittance, or opening
the door for the admittance, of the exhibit in question.
Specifically, the State cites that, "Mrs. Luna was asked questions
about the second photospread; specifically, whether any of the other
men in the photospread looked like defendant" (T. 66). Brief of
Respondent at 20.

It is important to note, however, that before

this question was asked of Mrs. Luna, the Court had already denied
the objection of defense counsel (T. 59-60).

Therefore, the defense

did not open the door justifying the admission of the exhibit into
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evidence but, rather, was responding to the earlier decision of the
court.
Concerning the second prong of the Harrington standard,
the State suggests that the average juror does not have the capacity
to understand the police procedures or to surmise prior criminality
from mug shot photographs.

Brief of Respondent at 20. This

contention is also meritless.

As indicated by counsel at trial

prior to the ruling by the court, nearly every person in America who
has ever watched a police/detective movie or television show
recognizes the very common front and side view photographs with the
accompanying placard to connote criminal behavior and bad
character.

Contrary to the State's assertion, the introduction of

the photospread did draw undue attention to the source or nature of
the photographs.

A legend was clearly visible in the photographs

through the window and more harmful information was readily
accessible within the exhibit.
Finally, the State suggests that the defendant and not
the prosecution informed the jury that he was a convicted felon,
contending, therefore, that any error with regard to the mug showup
folder would be rendered harmless pursuant to the rules of
evidence.

Again, this assertion is erroneous.

The admittance into

evidence of the mug showup folder was introduced during the State's
case-in-chief, and the discussion of Mr. Pacheco's prior Attempted
Burglary conviction was not introduced until the defense case.
However, as the introduction of the prior criminal conviction is
also claimed error (see subpoint B infra), reliance on this error to
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substantiate or validate the admission of the mug showup folder is
untenable.
Mr. Pacheco relies on United States v. Harrington and
cases from other jurisdictions cited in his opening brief, Brief of
Appellate at 20-25, to substantiate the serious prejudice which
follows the introduction of mugshot photograph evidence.
Mr. Pacheco, at this juncture, further urges that case law from this
jurisdiction also recognizes the debilitating prejudice that occurs
whenever prior conviction and other crimes evidence reaches the
jury.

See State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 14 n.l (Jan. 31,

1989) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); State v. James, 767 P.2d 549
(Utah 1989); State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988); State v.
Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1986); State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985); State v.
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980); State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325
(Utah 1979).
A review of the exhibit and an examination of the case
law reveal the highly inflammatory nature of the evidence presented
to the jury and the accompanying prejudice to Mr. Pacheco's rights
to a fair trial.

Accordingly, this Court should recognize as error

the admittance of the exhibit and reverse the conviction of
Mr. Pacheco and remand for a new trial.
B.

PRIOR ATTEMPTED BURGLARY CONVICTION

The State contends that despite the fact defendant filed
an in limine motion to preclude the evidence of prior criminal
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convictions, Mr. Pacheco is precluded from raising this issue absent
a ruling on the record.

Brief of Respondent at 22. The State cites

no Utah case law to support this position.

The State then cites

Utah case law for the distinct proposition that the Utah Supreme
Court will not rule on matters outside of the record.

The record in

this case, however, is sufficient to support Mr. Pacheco's claims.
A motion in limine was filed pursuant to Rules 609 and 403 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence to prohibit the introduction of prior
conviction evidence (R. 37). The record also reflects that the jury
was instructed to limit the prior conviction evidence of Mr. Pacheco
to the sole purpose of judging his credibility (R. 127).
Mr. Pacheco asserts that the motion in limine filed with the Court
and the accompanying jury instruction to limit the use of such
evidence is sufficient record to preserve the issue for appellate
review.
To buttress this assertion, Mr. Pacheco cites State v.
Seymour, 417 P.2d 655 (Utah 1966).

In Seymour, the appellant

claimed he was not represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing
and contended error occurred when the trial court denied a
subsequent motion to dismiss on that basis.

The Utah Supreme Court

indicated that indeed there is uncertainty in the record as to
whether defendant had counsel at the time he waived preliminary
hearing and ruled as follows:
Inasmuch as there is no transcript as to what
happened when that issue was presented to the
district court, we normally should presume that
what was said and done justifies the court's
ruling. But in this instance, we set that aside
and consider the more fundamental proposition
- 16 -

presented by defendant's appeal; Assuming that
the defendant was without counsel when he waived
preliminary hearing, is that a defect of such
gravity as to invalidate his conviction?
Id. at 657 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

Mr. Pacheco contends

that the nature of the error in this case is of such consequence
that like the question examined in Seymour, this Court should find
the record sufficient to justify reaching this issue.
The State suggests that it is impossible for this Court
to review the trial courtfs determination "if indeed one was made,"
urging the Court to not reach the issue.
22.

Even assuming, arguendo,

Brief of Respondent at

that the State is correct, this issue

may still be addressed by this Court under the allegation of plain
error.
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in State v. Verde, 101
Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Feb. 3, 189), errors which are deemed plain error
"are errors that we deem harmful, and although they were not
properly preserved below, they are raised on appeal and we conclude
that their erroneous character should be deemed obvious."

In

State v. Eldredge, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Feb. 1, 1989), the Court
indicated that there are two requirements for a finding of plain
error.

First, from an examination of the record, the Court must be

able to say that it should have been obvious to a trial court that
it was commiting error.

Second, and interrelated, is that the error

must affect the substantial rights of the accused—that the error be
harmful.
In State v. Eldredge, the appellant contended on appeal
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that findings of fact were not provided by the trial court in
denying an objection regarding the hearsay statements of a child
victim,

in concluding that this error did not meet the first prong

of the plain error requirements, the Court relied on the fact that
an integral and leading decision, State v, Nelson, 725 P.2d 1355
(Utah 1986), had not yet been decided.

In Mr. Pacheco's case,

however, substantial case law existed at the time of trial to have
informed the trial court that the admission of a prior conviction of
the same nature as the crime charged against the defendant is
extremely prejudicial and reversible error.

State v. Morehouse, 748

P.2d 217, 222 n.2 (Utah App. 1988) (Jackson, J., dissenting
opinion); State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1037-38 (Utah 1987);
State v. Banner; 717 P.2d 1325, 1334-35 (Utah 1986); and Terry v.
Z.C.M.I., 605 P.2d 314, 325 (Utah 1984).
In reviewing the second prong of whether this error could
be deemed plain, reliance on the same cases establish that the
substantial rights of Mr. Pacheco were violated when the jury
learned that he had been convicted on a prior occasion of the same
type of crime.

In a line of cases culminating in State v. Saunders,

699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court has
continually recognized that evidence of prior crimes is presumed
prejudicial inasmuch as the jury may then convict the defendant as a
bad person rather than on the evidence presented before them in
court.

Buttressing this argument are the cases cited above, i.e.

State v. Banner, wherein the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that
perhaps the most prejudicial introduction of prior conviction
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evidence is a similar crime wherein the jury then infers that if the
defendant has committed the crime on a prior occasion, he more than
likely committed it on this occasion.

717 P.2d at 1334-35.

Accordingly, regardless of whether this Court deems the
motion in limine and the related jury instruction sufficient to have
preserved the issue for appeal, introduction of a prior Attempted
Burglary conviction against Mr. Pacheco in this case is plain error
and requires reversal.

POINT III. THE EVIDENCE ADDOCED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS OF
MR. PACHECO.
The State maintains that the evidence adduced at trial
was sufficient to support the convictions of Mr. Pacheco, primarily
relying on the "remarkable memory of Mrs. Luna."
Respondent at 25.

Brief of

The State again, in addressing this issue,

referenced her identification as positive and without equivocation.
Brief of Respondent at 23-25.

As indicated in the Brief of

Appellant and earlier in this Reply Brief, the characterization of
Mrs. Luna's identification as positive and without equivocation is
misleading.

Further, the evidence does not support the contention

that her memory is remarkable.
Once again, the State did not factor into consideration
the suggestive procedures used to obtain Mrs. Luna's identification
testimony in analyzing this issue—the sufficiency of the evidence.
Within days of the event, Mrs. Luna was unable to positively
identify the perpetrator from the initial photospread (T. 61-62).
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She did, however, tentatively select Mr. Pachecofs photograph,
alleging that he could be the person (T. 62-63, 79). At that point,
the officer reaffirmed the unsure identification, stating that she
had in fact selected the suspect and that he would return later with
a more recent photograph (T. 64).
After several weeks, the officer returned with new
photographs enclosed in a manilla envelope labeled "'MUG1 SHOW-UP
FOLDER" (T. 65). The officer proceeded with the showing of the
second photospread, instructing Mrs. Luna that the suspect was
included among the photographs (T. 72). Mr. Pacheco was the only
person who had been repeated in both photospreads (T. 63-65, 72,
86); Mrs. Luna recognized this as well (T. 72). The subsequent
identification of Mr. Pacheco by Mrs. Luna was therefore suspect and
contrary to the concerns indicated in United States Supreme Court
decisions and Utah case law.

See Points I and II, supra.

Mrs. Luna was able to recall at the time of trial the
license plate of the blue and white car driven by the suspect.
However, aside from this achievement, little else supports the
State's claim that she possesses a remarkable memory.

For example,

besides not being able to make the positive identification within
days of the event (T. 64), Mrs. Luna herself commented that she was
not good at judging time (T. 64) and twice indicated she was not
good at judging ages (T. 66, 69). Further, she could not remember
whether all photographs shown to her in the first photospread were
of hispanic suspects (T. 68). She was unable to recall whether any
of those in the first photospread had moustaches (T. 69). She was
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unable to recall from memory whether police had even asked her
questions regarding the age of the perpetrator or the possibility of
facial hair on the perpetrator (T. 69). Mrs. Luna also could not
recall from memory how much time passed between the showings of the
first photospread and the second photospread (T. 69). In short,
contrary to the claims made by the State, the memory of Mrs. Luna is
not at all that remarkable.

It then follows that the

identification, as either a product of her memory or the suggestive
police process, is just not the stellar identification on which to
sustain a criminal conviction.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized numerous evils
inherent in an eyewitness identification.
483 (Utah 1986).

State v. Long, 721 P.2d

In State v. Long, the Utah Supreme Court outlined

numerous problems both potential and real with the memory process
itself and the ability of witnesses to accurately recall events.
State v. Long, 721 P.2d at 489-91.

The Court found that empirical

evidence documented the unreliability of eyewitness testimony with
countless studies "all lead[ing] inexorably to the conclusion that
human perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited
and fallible. • JEd. at 488. The Court further recognized that
[p]erhaps it is precisely because jurors do not
appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness testimony
that they give such testimony great weight. In
one notable study involving a simulated criminal
trial, 18% of the jurors voted to convict the
defendant when there were no eyewitnesses to the
crime. However, when a credible eyewitness was
presented, 72% voted to convict. And,
surprisingly, even when presented with an
eyewitness who was quite thoroughly discredited by
counsel, a full 68% still voted to convict.
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Id. at 490 (citations omitted).

As frightening as these statistics

are, the Court additionally acknowledged that research established
further problems of at least equal significance when eyewitness
testimony is obtained through the use of suggestive police lineups,
showups, and photo arrays.

I^d. (citing R. Buckhout, Eyewitness

Testimony, 15 Jurimetrics J. 171, 179-87 (1975)).
Because of the concern that uncorroborated identification
testimony of one eyewitness could serve as a linchpin in the
prosecution case resulting in a conviction contrary to State due
process strictures, the Court required in all such trials conducted
after State v. Long that a cautionary instruction be given jurors to
inform them of the potential problems with eyewitness identification
testimony.

State v. Long, 721 P.2d at 488, 492. While such an

instruction was requested and given in this case, the factual
preculiarities of the one uncorroborated eyewitness testimony,
coupled with a panoply of suggestive influences by police, and when
recalling the statistical propensities outlined above, this Court
should recognize that no reasonable jurors could have found the
evidence sufficient to convict Mr. Pacheco.

Rather, the factual

circumstances of Mrs. Luna's own testimony at trial more accurately
indicates her identification of Mr. Pacheco was a product of the
suggestive procedures used by the police officers and that the
jury's verdict was a product of misunderstanding the nature and
reliability of her eyewitness testimony.
Accordingly, this Court should recognize as a matter of
law that the identification testimony of Mrs. Luna is unable and
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insufficient to sustain the convictions of Mr. Pacheco.

This Court

should therefore reverse those convictions for insufficiency of the
evidence and remand the case with an order to dismiss the charges
against him.

CONCLUSION
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant,
Mr. Robert Paul pacheco, requests this Court to reverse his
convictions of Burglary and Theft and remand this case with an order
either for dismissal of the charges or for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this c^& ~~ day of March, 1989.

-<Mi-u±
JAMES A. VALD^Z
pendant/Appellant

HHARD G. UDA}
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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